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Abstract: This paper reviews the pros and cons of an early EU enlargement towards Central
and Eastern European Countries (CEECs hereafter). Firstly, the Maastricht criteria, which
cannot be literally assessed during the catching up process, but that nevertheless mirror the huge
efforts undertaken in order to (i) stabilise the economies, (ii) converge towards the EU, and
then (iii) participate in the EMU, are analysed. Secondly, real convergence is observed to
occur at different rates, depending upon the initial conditions faced and the productivity gains
realised by each country. Thirdly, computing the correlation of demand and supply shocks in a
sample of Euro countries, such as Ireland, Portugal and Spain, at the time when they were
entering the EU and the CEECs, gives some indication of the similarity of the business cycles
and economic structures of the CEECs on the one hand, and the EU on the other. However, we
argue that looking at static correlation only (averaged over the last decade) is too simplistic, as
these averages will be blurred by the transition process. Using the Kalman filter, we are able to
compute time varying correlation, hence differentiating between the transition and the most
recent period. Our results emphasise an ongoing process of demand shocks convergence, but
supply shocks divergence. Various exchange rate strategies are then discussed.
Abstrakt:  Tento èlánek posuzuje  pro a  proti rozšíøení Evropské Unie do zemí støední
a východní Evropy (Central and Eastern European Countries – CEEC – v textu). Zaprvé, jsou
analyzována Maastrichtská kriteria, která nemohou  být pøíliš  literárnì ocenìna bìhem
pøechodného procesu, ale která nicménì odráží ohromné snahy pøijaté z dùvodu (i) stabilizace
ekonomiky, (ii) smìøování  k EU, a (iii) úèast v EMU.  Za druhé, reálná konvergence se
objevuje v rùzných pomìrech, závisejících na vstupních podmínkách a nárùstech  produktivity v
každé zemi. Za tøetí, výpoèet korelace šokù poptávky a nabídky v CEEC  a ve vybraných
Evropských zemích, jako Irsko, Portugalsko a  Španìlsko, v dobì,  kdy vstupovaly do EU,
indikuje podobnost hospodáøských cyklù a ekonomických struktur CEEC a EU.  Dále uvádíme
argumenty, že pohled pouze na statické korelace (prùmìry za minulé desetiletí) je pøíliš
zjednodušený, protože tyto prùmìry jsou zastøeny procesem pøechodu k tržní ekonomice. Užitím
Kalmanova filtru jsme schopni vypoèítat korelaci mìnící se s èasem. Z toho vidíme rozlišení
výsledkù mezi raným a nedávným obdobím.  Naše výsledky ukazují konvergenci šokù
poptávky, ale divergenci šokù nabídky. Na závìr jsou diskutovány rùzné strategie smìnných
kurzù.
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1. Introduction
EU enlargement towards the East is unprecedented: First, the situation of the CEECs is very
different from that of the previous entrants into the EU (Spain, Portugal, Greece for example):
not only is the average GDP per head lower, there is also institutional underdevelopment and
immaturity in Eastern financial and banking sectors
1, although progress has been made in those
areas, reducing the disparity between the CEECs and the EU countries.  Secondly, should the
CEECs enter the EU in 2004, the delay between formal candidacy and actual admission would
be exceptionally short. More generally, the wide range of possible macro-economic situations,
both in terms of growth and inflation, may raise questions regarding the opportunity of a
common policy mix.
It is, then, an unprecedented enlargement, whose different conditions might be, at least at
first glance, contradictory : Maastricht criteria are not compatible with catching-up objectives,
because nominal exchange rate stability implies an inflation higher than the average of that of
the best three countries, as long as countries’ growth rates are higher than the European
average. Catching-up is not only measured in terms of macro-economic aggregates, it has also
an institutional dimension that, while harder to evaluate, might be essential. Thus, according to
Jürgen Kröger and Denis Redonnet (2001): “Compliance with the Copenhagen criteria takes
precedence over compliance with nominal convergence criteria, and therefore EMU
participation, for at least two reasons. First, greater progress towards real and structural
convergence should take place ahead of nominal convergence, even though the two can be
mutually supportive. Second, only countries that are functioning market economies capable of
coping with competitive pressures can be assessed for nominal convergence; that is, the
Maastricht criteria must be applied to “comparable economies”.”
                                                
 
1 See Erick Berglöf and Gérard Roland (1998), Jérôme Sgard (1995a), (1995b).3
Copenhagen criteria are harder to assess than Maastricht criteria. Besides, they are
much more likely to be affected by accession itself than macro-economic criteria (even though
recent literature on  OCAs has largely proved the endogenous nature of nominal and real
convergence criteria, of financial and economic integration, and of the degree of symmetry of
the shocks
2). That is why our purpose here is not to review all the necessary conditions for the
enlargement to be successful, but rather to focus on a subset of macro-economic criteria. When
joining the EU, the CEECs will have to adopt the “acquis communautaire”, part of which is the
EMU, if not the euro itself, whether in the short or medium term
3. Although this does not mean
that Maastricht criteria are required in the meantime, it implies convergence and stability along
these lines
4. Moreover, nominal convergence is a necessary (although not sufficient) condition
for real convergence to take place, and the very similarity in terms of GDP per head and GDP
volatility can serve as an additional criterion to see whether joining the same economic area is
in each country’s interest. Finally, sharing the same monetary policy is not only a matter of GDP
levels, but also of business cycles similarity. Assume that two countries, A (in the core, rich)
and B (peripheral and poor), have the same business cycle around a trend which is completely
different: they can share the same monetary policy, while the real exchange rate can adjust to
changing economic circumstances and shocks, not through changes in the nominal exchange rate,
but through changes in wages and prices.
This paper reviews and documents the pros and cons of the CEECs joining the EMU.
Section 2 examines how  the CEECs perform with regards to the traditional Maastricht criteria,
as well as the evolution of their current account, and its direct impact on the exchange rate.
                                                
 
2 See Frankel and Rose (1998).
 
3 See Agenda 2000, Strategy for Enlargement Document, Report on the progress made by every candidate
country on their way to accession, European Union Bulletin, Supplement 3/2000, p. 28 : “The Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) is an essential part of the « acquis ». It is however convenient to distinguish clearly
between participation in EMU – compulsory for all member states- and participation in the euro”.
 
4 This is similar to the non EMU countries (the UK, Denmark and Sweden) presenting a “convergence4
Although not required for eastern candidates to be eligible, these criteria allow a distinction
between two groups of countries, those where a sound macro-economic environment has
already emerged, and where the process of catching up is already at work, and those who still
experience large imbalances, hyperinflation, and where the convergence process is lagging. In
the long run, fiscal discipline is a good thing as well, for two complementary reasons. First,
controlling public expenditures should lead to a better allocation of funding; second fiscal
discipline yields lower interest rates, and also helps stabilise inflation expectations. Nominal
convergence has favoured real convergence in term of GDP per head, simply because economic
recovery cannot occur without stabilisation. The second set of criteria is therefore that of real
convergence, and section 3 again emphasises two “types” of countries which have to be clearly
separated for analytical purposes: those who would benefit in terms of catching-up from
anchoring their money to the euro for stabilisation purposes (Bulgaria and Romania), and those
who have the option of keeping their monetary and exchange rate policy independent, because
the toughest part of the stabilisation process has already been done. For these two groups the
rationale behind euroization or participation in the EMU is therefore different. In Section 4,
using the OCA approach as operationalised in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996), we try to
distinguish between countries for which a common monetary policy is a useful stabilisation tool
and those for which the costs would outweigh the benefits. Policy implications regarding the
exchange rate strategies for EU candidate countries are drawn in the conclusion.
2. “Enlarged” Maastricht criteria revisited 
According to the recent summit of Copenhagen in December 2002, the CEECs are supposed to
join the EU in the very near future, in May 2004 ( 2007 for Bulgaria and Romania), which
means, subsequently, EMU membership. EU admission requires candidate countries to have
                                                                                                                                                        
programme” in line with the EMU countries Growth and Stability Pact.5
achieved “the Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights,
and respect for and protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy, as
well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; the
ability to take on obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political,
economic, and monetary union.” The institutional Maastricht criteria were designed to facilitate
the latter aims of economic and monetary union, selecting EU countries by minimising
inflationary pressure in the common currency zone towards the “best practice countries”, and by
avoiding free riding behaviours, which would be unsustainable beyond the short term.
•  Inflation should be low, within 1.5% of the average inflation rate of the three countries with
the lowest rates over the past two years;
•  Long-term interest rates must be within 2% of the three lowest interest rates in EU;
•  Exchange rates also have to be stable, within the 15% ERM bands for at least two years;
•  Budget deficit and public debt should not be higher than 3% and 60% of GDP respectively,
and declining for the latter.
 
While in the nineties the best practice was assessed on the basis of national policies, it
is clear now that the benchmark can only be the European Central Bank. Furthermore, regarding
transition countries, the monetary requirements have to be modified in order to make
compatible the catching-up process - implying inflation rates above the EU average - and the
fiscal discipline across countries aspiring to sharing a common European currency
5. As a
consequence they are not formally required for the EU enlargement.
Even if Maastricht criteria are not formally required, CEECs often tried to manage their
currency in order to be in compliance with them. A strong argument for explaining this
                                                
 
5 One possibility would be that the level of inflation does not exceed inflation in tradables in order to adjust6
compliance can be found in a recent paper by  Gomulka [2001], who recalls that joining EU
means subsequently participating in EMU. It is clear for the author that the benefit from joining
the EU far exceeds the cost associated with fiscal discipline: it comes not only from budgetary
transfers from the West, but also from the possibility of facing lower interest rates without
raising uncertainty and increasing risk of speculative attacks
6. Hence, bearing in mind that the
institutional criteria are part of the strategy for entering the EU for some CEECs, it is worth
asking to what extent monetary and fiscal policies across CEECs were, and are still now, in
accordance with them.
[Insert Table 1 (a), Annex 1]
Applied to the CEECs, Maastricht criteria lead to distinguishing two subsets of
countries: Romania and Bulgaria on the one hand, the rest of the CEECs on the other. For
Romania, stabilisation is far from completion, with inflation mainly reflecting the monetary
financing of the deficit. Prices were regulated until 1996, when liberalisation resulted in a jump
in the inflation rate. For Bulgaria, the data clearly show the 1997 hyperinflation process, which
ended with the implementation of a currency board.
In other countries, inflation rates are still above the levels required by the Maastricht
criteria, but the trend is that of a decrease in inflation, from 28.2% in 1995 in Hungary, to an
estimated 5.3% in 2002. It is also worth noticing that while the average figure for inflation for
the euro was 2.1% in 2002, and the best three EU countries averaged 1.4%, the figures for the
Baltic States reveal very low inflation levels by historical EU standards (3.5% in Estonia;
1.6% in Latvia; and 0.4% in Lithuania). For the years 2000, 2001, and 2002, the CEECs
                                                                                                                                                        
appropriately for the Balassa-Samuelson effect.7
averages are single digit, at respectively 6.6%, 5.6% and 3.2%. Amongst the best performers,
the Czech republic employed a monetary policy based on keeping the nominal exchange rate
stable up to the crisis in 1997, and from then onwards moved to a policy of inflation targeting,
where de facto the korona proved to be quite stable
7. The three Baltic States implemented
either a credible and long lasting pegging to the DM, or even a currency board in Estonia, while
in Hungary or Poland, the exchange rate regimes are more flexible: Hungary adopted a fixed
peg, with small adjustments every year (which take into account the inflation differentials
between Hungary and the countries in the reference basket) and Poland moved from a crawling
peg to a managed float in 2000).
[Insert Table 1 (b-c), Annex 1]
Interest (lending and deposit) rates are quite high, far above the level of EU countries.
This reflects more the difficulties encountered in implementing a competitive and efficient
banking and financial system by these countries, which have to address the persistent problem
of moral hazard and adverse selection, than the high level of inflation rates. In the Czech
Republic for instance, the persistence of high interest levels while inflation declined
contributed to boosting commercial banks profits and to improving their capital position. In
addition, once a country decides to implement a fixed exchange rate regime, and inflation and
interest rates are high, interest rates in real terms are likely to fall below the European average
(and even to become negative). The monetary conditions index (MCI) measures the
expansiveness of interest rates; in a restructuring economy in which the hardening of the budget
constraint is essential, an overly expansive policy is not desirable.
                                                                                                                                                        
 
6 Joining EMU would imply avoiding the difficult trade-off between, on the one hand, low interest rates but
increasing financial vulnerability and high interest rates, an,d on the other, an increase in unemployment.
 
7 For an overview of the evolution of monetary policy in transition economies, see Brada and Kutan (2001).8
[Insert Table 1 (d-e), Annex 1]
Public and debt deficits finally are rather unstable, but at levels which remain
compatible with the 3% and 60% ratio of GDP criteria
8. In the case of transition countries, one
may fear that the low level of public debt observed at the beginning of the nineties was
underestimated and could increase sharply in the following years. However the data do not
support such an hypothesis: the trend was towards a continuous decrease, to 33.7% in 1998 (it
stabilises around 34% over 1999 – 2002), that is, half of the EU average. The debt’s decline in
Hungary, from 79% in 1992 down to 57.6% in 2002 (estimate), is particularly spectacular, and
it is worth noting that the Hungarian debt, as a percentage of GDP, has been akin to the EU’s
since as early as 1996. The evaluation of fiscal convergence in Baltic States by  Kutan and
Pautola-Mol (2001) emphasises similarly the impressive fiscal performance of these three
transition countries by Western European standards. Halpern and Nemeyi (2001)’s opinions are
much more reserved. The authors consider that the consolidation programmes required for
greater transparency (in the Czech Republic, for instance) – the lack of which casts doubt on
official statistics interpretation – or the problems associated with structural adjustments (in
Poland, for instance), could explain a deterioration of tax revenue in the coming years. The
«snowball »effect, according to which sustained growth leads to finance debt increases at
lower costs, probably helped the CEECs during the ‘90s (as was the case with Ireland), but
could harm them in the following years if a growth slowdown occurs.
                                                
 
8 The question of the optimal level of deficit in the CEECs is controversial. Although it can be argued that
public expenditures do contribute to enhanced growth, at least in the short run, we believe that this is not true
for the majority of transition countries, where the soft budget constraint still holds, particularly in the state
sector. Secondly the evidence for developing countries is that the level of public expenditures is negatively
correlated with that of growth;  see Havrylyshyn, Izvorski, and van Rooden (1998); Havrylyshyn, van Rooden
(2000); and De Melo and alii (1996).9
[Insert Table 1 (f) and Table 2, Annex 1]
Table 2 shows that the countries that achieved stability by anchoring of their currency
are later able to switch to more flexible regimes. Such is the case with the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. This suggests that the cost of loosening the option of a
counter-cyclical policy is higher for middling countries, “which are in an intense process of
structural change whose outcome is difficult to predict, and which might therefore need some
flexibility in their real exchange rate for some time”  ( Gros, 2000). But for very strong
countries, including Estonia, who fulfil the Maastricht criteria by means of  a currency board,
and for very unstable and emerging-market countries, like Romania and Bulgaria, unable to
engage in counter-cyclical monetary stabilisation policies, the cost of pegging the currencies
might be lower. Table 1 (f)  (Annex 1) reports the average and standard deviations of exchange
rates since the beginning of the transition, over two years. It can be seen that the exchange rates
have stabilised, and they fluctuate inside a relatively narrow band, that becomes narrower the
further the transition process proceeds.
Table 5 in Annex 1 reflects the sustainability of the current account, persistent deficits
reflecting a need for increasing financing that could endanger, among other factors, the stability
of the exchange rate and interest rates, hence putting at risk the macro-economic balance of the
country.
 
  3. Real convergence criteria
If nominal convergence is a necessary pre-requisite for economic recovery to occur, it is far
from sufficient. The literature on the impact of stabilisation and of “good” policies on growth
firmly establishes the link between inflation, domestic credit increases and budget deficit10
(which correspond exactly to the Maastricht criteria we looked at in the previous section), and
economic performance, even if, during the early years, stabilisation might cause a significant
slowdown. But what really matters for stabilisation to be sustainable, is to introduce measures
aimed at  liberalising the economy, such as internal and external prices liberalisation,
privatisation, abolition of former state controls, and so on. De Melo and Alii (1996) proposed
the first indicators of liberalisation which have been further extended by the EBRD. Relying
upon those indicators, they show that while macro policy explains a significant part of the
growth variance, structural reforms matter more, accounting for about 70% of the variance of
growth. Hence nominal convergence is not at odds with real convergence, but it is far from
sufficient.
 
This is why we look at real convergence, which is an ex post indicator of the success of
reforms and transition towards market based economies. We present two criteria: the
convergence in terms of GDP per head, and the sigma convergence, which measures the
evolution of the dispersion of GDP growth rates across countries.
 
Figures 1 to 3 (Annex 1) distinguish three groups of countries. First, the CEECs, who
display the highest GDP to German GDP per head ratio, with the more spectacular evolution for
Slovenia (the ratio was slightly above 25% in 1992 and approached 40% in 2002) ;then the
Baltic States, which show a higher convergence rate (which is to be expected from a lower
level), the GDP per head in percentage of that of Germany being multiplied by a factor of ten
over the period, up to 18% of Germany’s GDP by2002. On the other hand, Romania and
Bulgaria exhibit very modest convergence, being characterised  by a highly unstable growth
paths. The convergence path mirrors a phenomenon of real appreciation, implied by11
undervalued exchange rates at the starting date, with lower or even negative GDP growth rates,
and then productivity gains taking over and yielding higher growth over the most recent period.
 
  [Insert Figures 1 to 3, Annex 1]
 
Another important element is whether the examined countries tend to have similar GDP
growth rates evolution. Increasing dispersion in the GDP behaviour would be at odds with a
common monetary policy. This is what sigma convergence measures
9: a group of countries is
said to sigma converge when the variability of GDPs per head is being reduced. There is some
evidence that this is the case in our group of countries
10. Between 1992 and 2002, the
variability of GDP across countries decreases from 39% to 17%. Moreover, if we exclude
Romania and Bulgaria, the decline is even more impressive, beginning at 35% and declining to
12%.
[Insert Table 3, Annex 1]
By analysing nominal and real criteria we distinguish two sets of countries, that can
even be considered independently from the issue of EU accession: those that have respected a
certain road for macro-economic and structural adjustment and thereby succeeded in stabilising
their economy on the one hand
11, and those which failed to implement such policies and still
display high inflation rates, high interest rates, unstable exchange rates and large imbalances.
For the latter set of countries, Bulgaria and Romania, fixing the nominal exchange rate, or even
setting up a currency board, must be part of an entire stabilisation programme. The cost of non
                                                
 
9 For a more formal definition of sigma convergence, see Boone and Maurel (1998).
 
10 See  Kocenda (2001) for convergence of the real industrial output, among other macroeconomic
fundamentals, across the CEECs.12
stabilising is huge, but the logic here is far from that of converging towards the Maastricht
criteria. For the former, keeping in mind that EU accession requires the ability to take on
membership obligations, including adherence to the aims of monetary union, the cost of strongly
pegging the currencies to the euro should be assessed.
4. OCA criteria
Even if Maastricht criteria are not going to be applied literally to CEECs, entering the EU
requires very low inflation and exchange rate variability, while the higher than EU average
growth and the restructuring process itself are likely to create inflationary differentials and
exchange rate variability. The latter would justify a monetary policy and exchange rate policy
aimed at accommodating the adverse consequences of real appreciation and inflationary
pressures
12, and would be an argument against participating in EMU in the near future; CEECs
would be better off waiting until most of the restructuring process is over. A recent paper by
Coricelli and Jazbec (2001) provides evidence that the real exchange rate behaviour is strongly
influenced by structural reforms
13, at least at the beginning of transition. Nevertheless this
influence diminishes over time, and finally stabilises around the fifth or sixth year. “For several
Central and Eastern European countries in the process of accession to the European Union, the
dynamics of the real exchange rate can now be assimilated to that of previously acceding
countries such as Spain, Portugal, and Greece, with the  Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect
playing a dominant role at later stages of transition”.
                                                                                                                                                        
 
11 Namely the Czech and Slovak republics, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, and the Baltic States.
 
12 Productivity gains in the tradable sector imply inflation in the non tradable sector through the Balassa
Samuelson effect.
 
13 which are measured by the ratio of the workers employed in manufactured on the number of workers
employed in services, and instrumentalized by the well known structural reform index of De Melo, Denizer and
Gelb (1996) and total credit to the private sector (EBRD Transition Report, 1999).13
Another argument related to the above Balassa Samuelson effect is that the probability
of asymmetric shocks might still be high, requiring the use of an independent monetary and
exchange rate policy. But again, if we assume that the influence of asymmetric shocks imputable
to restructuring is over, then the question is whether the cost of accommodating higher inflation
and productivity gains by labour and price flexibility outweighs the benefit of being a member
of the EU currency union (the same question was asked for Portugal, Spain and Ireland when
they were candidates). In what follows, we show that the nineties were characterised by a level
of supply and demand shocks symmetry (between EU and CEECs) quite comparable to the
symmetry that prevailed between EU and previously acceding countries. A more worrying fact
is that while demand shocks symmetry seems to increase, the asymmetry in supply shocks
prevails; but this latter phenomenon may also be observed for countries such as Spain, Portugal,
and Ireland.
4.1 Methodology
Following the literature derived from OCA theory that was used to assess the cost of EMU for
“euroland countries”, we answer this question by assessing the differences in business cycles
between the EU and the eastern countries
14. The idea is that the closer the fluctuations of the
countries, the more they will benefit from a common policy response. On the other hand, if
shocks are asymmetric then giving up a tool of national policy management will be costly. A
measure of the similarity of business cycles across countries is the correlation of demand
shocks, and its evolution since the transition process began. Furthermore, with respect to
transition countries, the similarity of supply shocks should also be analysed. The former will
reflect temporary shock and hence the shape of the business cycle, while the second will
represent the structural side of the economy.14
For current EMU countries, the exchange rate was mainly a demand stabilisation tool.
For transition countries however, foregoing the exchange rate is foregoing a tool that was used
to adjust both demand and supply shocks, as exchange rate policies have often been used to help
address the adverse supply shocks of the transition towards a market economy, which rendered
entire sectors non competitive. They consisted sometimes of huge devaluations (see Poland) to
smooth the restructuring process and the increase in unemployment. In the long run, of course,
the currency should return to its equilibrium value, which implies a steady appreciation as
progress in restructuring is made, liquidation of uncompetitive sectors at world market clearing
prices occurs, and there are productivity gains in the newly emerging private sector.
Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that demand shocks are very much conditioned
by the nature of the monetary regime, whereas supply shocks are reflect the process of transition
towards the market, as argued above. Distinguishing demand from supply shocks is therefore
very important, since the former are likely to reflect an  endogeneous process where the
similarity of demand shocks is the very product of the alignment of CEECs monetary policy on
the EU monetary policy, while the latter are informative about whether CEECs are still facing
asymmetric shocks before entering the monetary union (once the convergence process has
resumed). Therefore we take into account the fact that countries that share a common policy are
likely to display the same (endogeneous) pattern of demand shocks as in the EU, while supply
shocks are more likely to reflect productivity gains occurring only in transition countries, that
is, to generate a certain level of asymmetry between EU member countries and CEECs
15. Our
methodology consists of two steps.
                                                                                                                                                        
 
14 For previous similar studies, see Boone (1997), Boone and Maurel (1999),  Horvath (2001).
15 De Grauwe and Aksoy (1999, page 8) cannot distinguish supply from demand shocks on the basis that
available time series are too short: “Unfortunately, this procedure requires relatively long time series. These15
1) Following the methodology of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996), demand and supply
shocks are estimated with a VAR model for the accession countries, United States and the
aggregate EU-15 as alternative benchmarks. Because the sample largely covers the transition
period, we expect the correlation coefficients between countries to be rather weak for both
types of shocks (Horvath, 2001). We pay attention to both the transition supply shock and to the
fact that OCA criteria fulfilment may be endogenous from the demand side
16, i.e. that demand
shocks are likely to be more satisfied as monetary integration deepens, owing to the process of
adherence to the EMU. Indeed, in many cases the currencies were more or less pegged to the
DM.
2) In a second step, Following Boone (1997) we use time-varying estimation (Kalman
filter) to compute “time-varying correlation coefficients”, and expect that the path of the
demand coefficients will mirror a convergence process at work. More formally, we estimate
time varying a(t) and b(t) coefficients in equation (1), and analyse their evolution over time:
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( US EU i CEECs EU X X t b t a X X - ￿ + = -      (1)
For a convergence process to be at work, both b(t) and a(t) must tend towards zero, as
this will mean that the shock X(CEEC(i)) is entirely explained by the reference (EU) shock.
Furthermore, the more b(t) diverges from zero and tends towards one, the more important the
rest of the world is (here proxied by the United States) in contributing to the shocks affecting the
                                                                                                                                                        
are as yet unavailable for central European countries. As a result, we will rely on a procedure which does not
attempt to separate demand and supply shocks”.
 
16 As argued by Frankel and Rose (1998) and Boone and  Maurel (1998). In explaining the symmetry of
business cycles, Frankel and Rose (1998) emphasise that a high degree of symmetry might be due to the
monetary regime, which would explain the level of trade integration as well. Hence in the equation where
economic co-variation is explained by trade, the latter has to be instrumented by distance.16
eastern country.
17 Intuitively, for supply shocks, we would expect  b(t) to increase or remain
stable over time as long as the transition process evolves; for demand shocks, we would expect
b(t) to start from a relatively high level, and to decrease over time as the monetary integration
deepens. Ultimately, this would mean that demand shocks in the candidate country and reference
country are getting closer and therefore can be addressed by a common monetary policy, while
supply shocks have to be addressed through internal adjustments
18.
4.2  Data  
For running the VAR model we used real GDP in national currencies and GDP deflator. Our
sample consists of four developed countries (Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the United States), for
whom yearly and quarterly time series are available. It covers the period 1962 – 2002.  Both
yearly and quarterly data are seasonally adjusted by the OECD.
We add to that core sample ten EU accession countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. For those
countries the data are quarterly, from 1990 up to 2002. The sources are mixed: OECD, IMF and
national statistics. While OECD data are already seasonally adjusted, we had to adjust the
remainder by applying the U.S. Bureau of Census’ X12  procedure (the same approach as used
by the OECD).
4.3  Results
Comparing the results based upon yearly and quarterly frequency allows the selection of
“optimal lag length” for eastern countries in the VAR analysis, for whom only quarterly data are
                                                
 
17 For details on the VAR methodology, see Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996) and Boone and Maurel (1998);
for details on the application of the Kalman filter to this analysis, see Boone (1997).
 
18 Our methodology does not take into account the possibility that transmission mechanisms are likely to differ
across current EMU countries and candidate countries. Such differences could influence the degree of17
available. The results in Boone (1997), who extracts demand and supply shocks for EU
countries using a two-lag VAR process, are used as a benchmark. As can be seen in Annex A,
eight lags deliver a similar output as two lags for yearly data. In subsequent analysis, although
the marginal cost of adding a lag is high given the short time span, we will present results based
upon eight lags, equivalent to two years.
This approach should be adopted  with considerable caution. First, the sample sizes are
small, hence complicating the task of econometrics. Second, quarterly data are very
informative, but can also be noisy. Thirdly, although a deeper convergence process may be at
work, it might be too recent and/or too weak to be captured by an econometric estimation.
Hence, our analysis is based upon the following definitions: we consider that (i) a process of
convergence is at work if a(t) is constant and close to zero and b(t) declines over the period;
convergence is weak if (ii) either a(t) is constant but not necessarily nil, and b(t) declines
towards zero or (iii) b(t) shows signs of decline at least over the latest part of the sample, or
has shown signs of decline but with most recent observations departing; (iv) the pattern is
unclear when we observe for either a(t) or b(t) an erratic pattern, although the trend for b(t) is
downwards; and (v) there is no convergence (there is divergence) in all other cases.
Finally, assessing whether pegging the currency is a good option can be asked in
absolute terms, but also in relative terms, by comparing the “optimality” of pegging for
candidate and  EU member countries, like Ireland, Spain and Portugal, at the time when they
were entering the EU, and in the nineties. We could have chosen Greece as an alternative
benchmark, but the lack of data for Greece excluded this possibility. Austria, Finland and
Sweden joined the EU in 1995 (see table 6), which is too late for analysing the consequences of
                                                                                                                                                        
symmetry of business cycles.18
their EU memberships; furthermore, we considered that in terms of GDP per head, CEECs are
more similar to Mediterranean countries than to Scandinavian ones.
Results are reported in Annex A for Ireland, Portugal and Spain and Annex B for
CEECs. Overall, it turns out that distinguishing some clear pattern is not such a difficult task
despite the short period of time. Regarding supply shocks, one can observe that Portugal and
Spain do converge towards EU prior to their entry into EU in 1986, while the contrary holds for
the majority of CEECs, for whom the evolution of  a(t) and b(t) denotes clearly a pattern of
divergence. This striking feature of the transition towards the EU market in the nineties has to
be mitigated by two remarks. Firstly, the coefficient  b(t) averaged over a ten years period
before the Spanish and Portuguese EU entry
19 is higher than its Eastern counterpart
20. Hungarian
supply shocks for instance are linked to EU ones by a factor of 0.39, while the same factor
ranges from 0.37 (Portugal) to 0.5 (Spain) for EU former candidates. Furthermore, after having
converged up to the date of their EU memberships, both Portugal and Spain diverge from the EU
pattern of supply shocks, which suggests that the criteria of symmetry do not necessarily have to
be met for a proper functioning of the EU monetary policy co-ordination. One argument
concerning this latter result is that asymmetry is not necessarily bad news in as much as it
enables participating states to diversify idiosyncratic risks. In other words,  region specific
productivity shocks are beneficial to union-wide income, because all other regions may hold
claims on that part
21. Moreover, within EMU, a deeper level of asset portfolio diversification
can be achieved thanks to capital market integration.
                                                
 
19 And only over two years for Ireland, which entered the EU in 1973.
 
20 See table B and subscripts 1 to 4 which allow to compare table A (Annex A) and Table B itself.
 
21 See Asdrubali Sorensen and Yosha (1996), Mélitz and Zumer (2000), and McKinnon (2002).19
CEECs’ convergence over the last period is more clear-cut from the demand side than
from the supply side. This is not surprising, given that the shock of transition towards a market
economy affected transition countries but obviously not EU countries. Therefore, if supply
shocks convergence is rather loose, demand shocks are increasingly synchronised with EU
demand shocks. This has to be linked to the strategy of accession undertaken by many CEECs,
who have been able to achieve some measure of convergence between the evolution of their
money stock and that of Germany, as shown in Brada and Kutan (2001).
Overall, countries achieve higher level of convergence when they commit towards
fixing their currencies: both supply and demand shocks (only demand shocks) are converging
towards EU shocks in Estonia (in Latvia). For the latter Kutan et Pautola-Mol (2001) measure
cyclical sensitivity of State’s budget to business cycle, and conclude that “  evidence on the
cyclical sensitivity of the Baltic States suggests that the Stability and Growth Pact […] would
offer enough room for automatic fiscal stabilizers in Estonia and Latvia “.
4.4  Exchange rate strategies for EU candidate countries
Which exchange rate regimes are desirable for countries wanting to join the EU in the mean
term ? Two of them are clearly incompatible with the admission agenda
22, which implies
notably that the exchange rate policy must be considered as a matter of common interest, and
that, in the relatively short term, the newcomer country must apply the ERM2 functioning rules.
More concretely exchange rates must not depart from central parity and their volatility must not
exceed a 15% fluctuation band for at least two years
23. Hence crawling pegs, and pegs against
                                                
 
22 This agenda consists of four steps: “ (1) prior to accession no formal restriction on the choice of the
exchange rate regime; (2) upon accession, new Member states must adopt an exchange rate policy as a matter
of common interest (Article 124); (3) after accession, although not necessarily immediately, join the EMR2;
(4) after application of the procedure in  Article 121, the adoption of the rate at which the euro will be
substituted for the currency of the Member State and start preparations to introduce the euro.”
 
23 Hungary’s regime - horizontal band with 15% fluctuation bands - is compatible with ERM2.20
anchors other than the euro, cannot be allowed. Other exchange rate regimes are compatible
with the idea of ERM2 participation, conditioned to their credibility and to their ability not to
put the catching up process of the CEECs at risk :
•  Currency boards (and unilateral « euroization ») are possible as long as fiscal
discipline is assured and prices and wages are flexible enough so as to maintain
the inflation differential (resulting from the growth differential) below a critical
level that would endanger the country competitiveness ; and also as long as the
chosen peg is the euro (as is the case in Estonia and Lithuania, but not in Latvia,
where the anchor is the SDR).
•  The Irish example shows that a fixed nominal exchange rate does not curtail
growth (one might even rather say the contrary). It must be noted that in this
strategy the choice of the right conversion rate upon accession into the monetary
union is essential, particularly when candidate countries have higher growth
potentials than other member countries. An initial underestimation allows in fact
a later real exchange rate appreciation, that in turn facilitates the absorption of
the asymmetric supply shocks that were exposed in the preceding section.
George M.  von  Furstenberg (2002) shows that “Balassa-Samuelson effects
provide little reason for small countries to shun monetary union while they are
catching up through fast MFP (Multifactor Productivity) growth to the slower-
growing countries at its core unless their remaining catch-up potential is very
large”. In other words, the inflation induced by the Balassa-Samuelson effect
(that is, a price increase not proportional to the productivity gains because of the
existence of a sector of non tradable goods) exceeds a critical percentage if the
growth differential is high and sustainable. It is also unlikely to be higher among
nations than among  regions :  Teolis et  von  Furstenberg (1993, pp. 259-261)21
show that when Mexico fixed its exchange rate in 1988, the volatility of the real
exchange rate between Mexico and the United States did not exceed the one
prevailing between the cities of Chicago and Los Angeles.
•  Managed float, or  full float, are also feasible options - five accession
countries, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, currently
operate under managed float - but practice shows that they have either inflation
targeting, or monetary aggregates targeting policies. Those latter policies are
characterised by P. B. Kenen (2002, page 113) as being “the last expensive and
most sensible way to confer credibility on monetary policy”.
As shown in the previous section, the Czech and Slovenian cases are interesting
because, while supply shocks are clearly divergent, demand is increasingly explained by
European demand shocks
24. The alignment of exchange and monetary policies on Germany
25, or
on a wider scale on the EU, could be at the origin of this convergence process. Concerning
supply shocks, which correspond to the more structural side of the economy, the transition
process itself, that is convergence of the GDP per head towards the European level, consists in
productivity shocks occurring only in the East. So there cannot be (and it is not desirable that
there should be) supply shocks convergence, as long as the catching-up of the GDP per head
and productivity levels is not achieved. If this catch-up potential is very high – and as a result if
the probability of asymmetric supply shocks remains high - and if prices are not flexible
enough, then the definitive fixing of the exchange rate might not be desirable. In this case,
simply joining the ERM2 is the best strategy, because it gives countries greater latitude for
absorbing asymmetric supply shocks, it formally prepares them for the later stage of adopting
                                                
 
24 Demand shocks are temporary with no long run effect on output and prices.
 
25 The adoption of fixed exchange rate regimes and the anchoring on German monetary aggregates indicators as
shown by Brada and Kutan ( 2001 ).22
the euro, and it corresponds to an explicit agenda to which all different parties involved agree
upon. For Jürgen Kröger and Denis Redonnet (2001): “ERM2 could provide the framework for
managing a flexible exchange rate, allowing for successful catching-up while maintaining a
clear orientation towards nominal convergence – and the ultimate adoption of the  euro”.
Exchange rates are increasingly compatible with ERM2 functioning rules : Table 1 (f) shows
that nominal exchange rate volatility computed over two years is decreasing on the one hand,
and fluctuates around its mean (over the same period) inside a 15% band. If the conditions
26 for
a credible Currency Board (or a unilateral “euroization”) are met, fixing the nominal exchange
rate is even better because it shows that the candidate country is able to directly participate in
the EMU during its catching up phase
27. Another advantage of this strategy is that it enhances the
credibility of EU membership candidate countries, by showing that they are willing to assume




Institutional criteria are at the moment unevenly satisfied by the CEECs. But those criteria are
not formally required for them to enter the EU. The reason is that the current level of inflation
                                                
 
26 These extremely tight conditions are the reason why currency boards are introduced only in exceptional
situations : Bulgaria set one up in ’97 in order to control inflation. Unilateral “euroization” corresponds also
to extreme situations, like the one in Montenegro : DM, on November the 2
nd 1999 (see Duchêne and Alii
(2000)).
 
27 Because it can absorb asymmetric shocks due to price and wage flexibility. Babetski (2002) shows that (i)
wages are more flexible in the CEECs than in western European countries;  (ii) wage flexibility explains in the
Granger sense the exchange rate fluctuations. Countries with more flexible labour markets adopt less flexible
exchange rate regimes. Data does not allow testing for reversed causality, but it can be conjectured that
adoption of the euro would mean greater flexibility in the labour market.
 
28 In this respect, the artificial distinction between currency boards and unilateral « euroization » shows that the
decision of EU enlargement has an essential political dimension. Some pretend that while the former are
compatible with the EU Treaty, the latter “does not respect the principles of EMU accession negotiations, does
not respect the economic rationale of the Treaty and of accession. Finally the euro can become a given
country’s currency only when the Council takes the decision in keeping with the Treaty procedures.” Adopting23
partly reflects the transition process, and as long as the rate of growth in those countries is
expected to be higher than in EU countries, keeping inflation at low levels, and at the same time
fixing nominal exchange rates, simply makes no sense. The catching up process implies that
CEECs can expect a 5 percent growth differential with current members, to be associated with
a 2 percent inflation differential. For Daniel Gros, this inflation differential can reach 3 and
even 4 percent.
Secondly, focusing on the similarity of business cycles and economic structures
provides some encouraging signs of convergence, although a great deal of progress could be
made in this respect. Nevertheless, even if the evidence that some of the CEECs are subject to
shocks similar to the German or EU ones is rather weak, especially for the supply side, one
should recall that the pattern of convergence was quite loose when Spain or Portugal were
candidates
29. Hence, the criteria of business cycle convergence should not be overemphasised.
Supply shocks are not converging, which might be due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
The effect has been found to be especially relevant when an open economy not depending on
primary resources is growing fast by changing industrial structure and export composition (Ito,
Isard and Symansky, 1999, p. 126), which is exactly the case with CEECs.  But the absence of
supply convergence is not necessarily bad from the point of view of EMU memberships.
Emerging countries, often unable to engage in counter cyclical policy
30, by fixing nominal
exchange rates, have simply to let productivity gains translate into inflation differentials
endogenously. The latter, which are equilibrating and consistent with international
                                                                                                                                                        
the opposite position, Gros ( 2000) pleads for “euroisation from the Atlantic to the Urals”.
 
29 Their business cycles synchronism with EU does not turn out to be higher over the last decade.
 
30 They de facto have followed the German Central Bank policy.24
competitiveness
31, are better than policy-induced differences in inflation rates that imperil the
credibility of any exchange rate regimes, whatever fix or floating. For Von Furstenberg (2002,
page 17): “Both the empirical evidence and theory suggest that differences in excess of 4
percentage points of individual member countries’ annual inflation rates from the GDP-
weighted average inflation rate for all such countries are unlikely. Furthermore, these
differences tend to diminish over time and generally are smaller than the differences observed
prior to the credible fixing of exchange rates in the run-up to monetary union.”
Demand shocks convergence is more clear-cut. This is in line with  Brada and Kutan
(2001), who show that CEECs were able to mimic ECB policies regarding the growth of their
money base (allowing us to interpret the inflation differential as simply reflecting the Balassa-
Samuelson effect and the process of convergence itself). As a result, giving up monetary policy
independence will not be so costly at the time of EU entry. It has been shown,
32 furthermore,
that fiscal policy was able to smooth business cycles, within the limits imposed by the Stability
Pact and Maastricht criteria.
This paper reviewed and applied the classical OCA criteria to CEECs, which qualify
for imminent EU entry, as soon as 2004, as decided in Brussels and Copenhagen. But it does not
consider the institutional aspects of that enlargement, which could make it much more
successful. What is worrying is that the current EU members have not shown (at least up to
now) a strong enough intent to implement the necessary reforms to the EU budget and
institutional operations - yet a date has been set and there are great expectations on the side of
the CEECs. For the enlargement to be a complete success, conditions ensuring a more rapid
convergence of the CEECs need to be put in place. This will not only benefit those countries,
                                                
 
31 As argued quite convincingly in von Furstenberg (2002).25
but also alleviate the implied burden for the existing EU members, allowing both sides to reap
the full benefit of this experience.
                                                                                                                                                        
 
32 For the three Baltic States, see Kutan et Pautola-Mol (2001).26
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Annex 1
Table 1.  Maastricht criteria applied to the CEECs
a) Inflation rate
1 (% change, annual averages)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Bulgaria 26.3 414.4 91.3 72.9 95.9 62.2 121.6 1058.4 18.7 2.6 10.3 7.4 5.8
Czech Rep. 9.7 52.0 11.1 20.8 9.9 9.1 8.9 8.4 10.7 2.1 3.9 4.7 2.2
Hungary 39.2 34.8 23.2 22.5 18.9 28.3 23.6 18.3 14.1 10.0 9.8 9.2 5.3
Poland 553.6 76.8 45.3 36.9 33.3 28.0 19.8 15.1 11.7 7.3 10.1 5.5 2.2
Romania 5.1 170.2 210.4 256.1 136.8 32.3 38.8 154.8 59.1 45.8 45.7 34.5 23.0
Slovakia 10.8 61.2 10.0 23.2 13.4 10.0 5.8 6.1 6.7 10.5 12.0 7.1 3.3
Slovenia 551.6 115.0 207.3 32.9 21.0 13.5 9.9 8.4 7.9 6.1 8.9 8.4 7.4
Estonia 23.1 211.0 1077.7 89.8 47.6 29.0 23.0 11.2 8.2 3.3 4.0 5.8 3.5
Latvia 10.5 172 951 109 35.9 25.0 17.6 8.6 4.5 2.4 2.7 2.5 1.6




151 119 418 93.1 31.5 22.8 16.7 10.6 8.6 5.3 6.6 5.6 3.2
Euro area
average
4.6 4.1 4.6 3.9 3.2 3.0 2.5 1.9 1.4 1.2 2.4 2.7 2.1
EU average 5.1 4.7 4.5 3.7 2.9 2.9 2.5 1.8 1.4 1.2 2.1 2.5 2.0
"3 best EU" av.
2 4.3 4.1 4.4 3.5 2.6 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.1 0.8 1.7 2.1 1.4
Notes: 1 Percentage change in consumer price index in local currency (period average), over previous year.
2 Three "best performing EU countries" with lowest inflation in 2002 are
 United Kingdom, Germany and Austria
Sources: The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Data, 2002; EBRD Transition Report, 2001; authors’ computations29
Table 1.  (continued)  Maastricht criteria applied to the CEECs
b) Deposit interest rate (% per annum)
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Bulgaria n.a. 39.5 45.0 42.6 51.1 35.9 74.7 46.8 3.0 3.2 3.1 2.9 2.8
Czech Rep. n.a. n.a. n.a. 7.0 7.1 7.0 6.8 7.7 8.1 4.5 3.4 3.0 2.8
Hungary 24.7 30.4 24.4 15.7 20.3 26.1 22.2 18.5 16.2 13.3 9.6 9.3 7.4
Poland 41.7 53.5 37.8 36.7 33.4 26.8 20.0 19.4 18.2 11.2 14.2 11.8 6.0
Romania n.a. n.a. n.a. 42.5 49.5 37.9 41.5 57.2 44.5 49.1 33.0 26.7 19.6
Slovakia n.a. n.a. n.a. 8.0 9.3 9.0 9.3 13.4 16.3 14.4 8.4 6.5 6.1
Slovenia n.a. 682.5 153.0 33.0 28.1 15.4 15.1 13.2 10.5 7.2 10.1 9.8 6.6
Estonia n.a. n.a. n.a. 15.9 11.5 8.7 6.1 6.2 8.1 4.2 3.8 4.0 3.0
Latvia 328.9 662.5 n.a. 34.8 31.7 14.8 11.7 5.9 5.3 5.0 4.4 5.2 3.5
Lithuania n.a. n.a. n.a. 88.3 48.4 20.1 14.0 7.9 6.0 4.9 3.9 3.0 1.7
CEECs average 132 294 65.1 32.5 29.0 20.2 22.1 19.6 13.6 11.7 9.4 8.2 6.0
"3 best EU" av.
1 8.8 7.7 6.8 3.7 2.4 2.6 1.9 2.0 2.3 1.4 1.7 1.4 1.0
Euro area
average
7.9 8.1 8.1 7.0 5.8 5.5 4.4 3.6 3.4 2.6 3.0 2.9 2.3
EU-15 average 8.4 8.1 8.0 6.7 5.5 5.3 4.1 3.5 3.3 2.5 3.0 2.8 2.2
Note:  
1 In 2002: Ireland, United Kingdom and Finland
Sources: The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Data, 2002; EBRD Transition Report, 2001; authors’ computations
 
  c) Lending interest rate (% per annum)
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Bulgaria n.a. 48.4 56.7 58.3 72.6 59.0 123.5 84.0 13.3 12.8 11.5 11.1 9.4
Czech Rep. n.a. n.a. n.a. 14.1 13.1 12.8 12.5 13.2 12.8 8.7 7.2 7.1 5.6
Hungary 28.8 35.1 33.0 25.4 27.4 32.6 27.3 21.8 19.3 16.3 12.6 12.1 10.2
Poland 504.2 54.6 39.0 35.3 32.8 33.5 26.1 25.0 24.5 17.0 20.0 18.4 12.0
Romania n.a. n.a. n.a. 86.4 61.8 47.3 51.3 67.5 55.1 61.2 46.2 38.8 28.5
Slovakia n.a. n.a. n.a. 14.4 14.6 16.9 13.9 18.7 21.2 21.1 14.9 11.2 10.5
Slovenia n.a. 824.6 195.1 48.6 38.9 23.4 22.6 20.0 16.1 12.4 15.8 15.0 12.4
Estonia n.a. n.a. 32.6 33.7 24.7 19.0 14.9 11.8 15.1 11.1 7.4 7.8 7.5
Latvia n.a. n.a. n.a. 86.4 55.9 34.6 25.8 15.3 14.3 14.2 11.9 11.2 10.0
Lithuania n.a. n.a. n.a. 91.8 62.3 27.1 21.6 14.4 12.2 13.1 12.1 9.6 7.0
  CEECs average 267 241 71.3 49.4 40.4 30.6 34.0 29.2 20.4 18.8 16.0 14.2 11.3
"3 best EU" av.
 1 14.2 12.4 11.3 9.5 7.8 7.9 6.8 6.5 5.9 4.3 5.3 4.7 3.9
Euro area
average
14.4 14.7 14.7 13.0 10.9 10.4 9.2 8.0 7.6 6.1 7.1 6.9 5.9
EU-15 average 14.6 14.3 14.0 12.3 10.5 10.2 8.8 7.9 7.4 6.1 7.0 6.7 5.8
Note:  
1 In 2002: United Kingdom, Spain and the Netherlands
Sources: The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Data, 2002; EBRD Transition Report, 2001; authors’ computations30
Table 1.  (continued)  Maastricht criteria applied to the CEECs
d) Budget balance (% GDP)
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Bulgaria -8,1 -4,5 -5.6 -10.9 -5.7 -5.6 -10.4 -3.0 1.0 -0.9 -1.0 -0.9 -0.8
Czech Rep.   -0,2 -1.9 -0.1 0.1 0.9 0.5 -0.1 -0.9 -1.6 -2.3 -2.3 -3.1 -6.1
Hungary 0.5 -2.9 -6.1 -6.0 -7.5 1.1 -1.6 -1.2 -6.5 -3.2 -3.5 -5.2 -6.5
Poland 0.4 -3.8 -6.0 -2.8 -2.8 -2.4 -2.4 -1.3 -2.4 -2.0 -2.2 -4.5 -5.3
Romania -0.4 -1.9 -4.4 -1.7 -4.2 -4.1 -4.9 -3.6 -2.8 -2.5 -3.6 -3.1 -2.9
Slovakia n.a. n.a. -11,9 -6,0 -1.2 0.4 -1.2 -4.8 -4.7 -3.4 -3.9 -4.4 -6.2
Slovenia n.a. 2,6 1.2 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.3 -1.2 -0.8 -0.6 -1.4 -1.4 -3.0
Estonia n.a. n.a. -0.4 -0.7 1.3 -1.3 -1.9 2.2 -0.3 -4.6 -1.0 0.5 1.1
Latvia n.a. n.a. 0.8 0.6 -4.1 -3.1 -1.4 1.2 0.1 -4.0 -2.8 -1.8 -1.8
Lithuania n.a. n.a. n.a. -5.3 -4.8 -4.5 -4.5 -1.8 -5.9 -8.5 -2.8 -1.9 -1.8
CEECs average 0.2 -2.6 -2.6 -2.9 -2.8 -1.9 -2.8 -1.4 -2.4 -3.2 -2.5 -2.6 -3.3
Euro area average -4.7 -5.0 -5.1 -5.8 -5.1 -5.0 -4.3 -2.6 -2.2 -1.3 0.2 -1.4 -2.2
EU average -3.9 -4.6 -5.3 -6.2 -5.4 -5.1 -4.2 -2.5 -1.6 -0.7 0.6 -0.8 -1.8
Sources: The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Data, 2002; EBRD Transition Report, 2001; authors’ computations
e) Public debt*** (% GDP)
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Bulgaria n.a. n.a. 158,7 150.1 169.0 114.7 300.5 103.0 79.8 84.9 77.1 70.2 66.0
Czech Rep. n.a. n.a. n.a. 18,8 17,6 15,3 13.7 13.5 13.7 15.0 18.8 23.0 30.6
Hungary n.a. 74.6 79.0 90.4 88.2 86.4 72.8 63.9 62.3 61.2 55.6 54.1 57.6
Poland n.a. n.a. 147,3 88,7 72.4 54.3 47.9 46.9 42.9 43.4 39.6 40.4 44.9
Romania n.a. 10.7 25.7 24.8 21.6 26.2 33.4 32.8 32.3 32.7 31.5 31.2 31.7
Slovakia n.a. n.a. n.a. 37.5 35.8 35.6 35.1 38.6 36.1 35.7 41.0 41.8 45.5
Slovenia n.a. n.a. 45,6 33.7 28.4 28.0 29.6 31.9 32.6 35.5 36.8 36.4 34.4
Estonia n.a. n.a. 3.3 5.1 4.7 4.5 5.0 4.3 4.5 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.0
Latvia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 14.2 16.2 14.5 12.0 10.4 13.1 13.3 15.0 14.9
Lithuania n.a. n.a. n.a. 14.8 15.8 19.5 23.2 19.1 22.4 28.3 28.2 26.9 24.4
CEECs average n.a. 42.7 36.0 50.9 50.0 42.8 57.6 36.6 33.7 35.4 34.6 34.2 35.3
Euro area average 61.0 61.2 65.1 69.3 71.1 75.1 77.9 78.1 77.4 75.3 73.1 72.3 72.5
EU average 58.0 58.5 63.1 68.1 69.3 73.2 75.2 74.8 74.3 71.4 68.7 67.7 67.4
Sources: The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Data, 2002; EBRD Transition Report, 2001; authors’ computations31
Table 1.  (continued)  Maastricht criteria applied to the CEECs
f) Volatility of nominal exchange rates
1 (%)
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Bulgaria n.a. 24.5 5.5 39.7 20.1 77.0 85.6 15.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Czech Rep. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.4 1.2 1.0 4.4 4.3 2.9 2.6 2.8 5.5
Hungary 8.0 6.2 4.4 9.6 16.0 10.3 5.8 7.9 4.3 1.8 2.3 3.4
Poland 6.9 17.3 12.6 14.5 9.5 4.9 5.7 4.7 5.4 3.7 5.6 5.1
Romania 94.7 77.5 48.5 41.7 19.2 22.1 36.9 14.8 26.7 13.2 14.8 10.1
Slovakia n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.9 1.6 0.9 1.5 3.9 6.7 2.8 1.6 1.7
Slovenia n.a. n.a. 14.4 8.4 2.1 5.6 3.2 2.0 2.4 3.5 3.4 2.2
Estonia n.a. n.a. 2.1 0.8 1.6 1.3 1.8 0.5 0.5 0.1 1.0 1.1
Latvia n.a. n.a. 17.1 13.8 2.5 1.3 3.4 2.0 3.8 6.4 2.6 2.5
Lithuania n.a. n.a. n.a. 10.5 6.4 2.4 6.1 3.4 4.4 8.6 4.6 2.7
CEECs average 36.5 31.4 14.9 14.4 8.0 12.7 15.4 5.9 5.8 4.3 3.9 3.4
US 5.8 5.8 6.5 3.7 5.9 2.4 6.1 3.4 4.4 8.6 4.6 4.4
 
Note: 1 Standard deviations in percent  to  average nominal exchange rates to ECU/Euro over two  preceding
years
Source: Authors' computations based on the IMF International Financial Statistics, November  2002, monthly
averages
Table 2. Exchange rate regimes in the CEECs
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Bulgaria 3 8 8 8 8 8 8 2 2 2 2 2 2
Czech Rep. 3 3 3 3 3 3 6 7 7 7 7 7 7
Hungary 3 3 3 3 3 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
Poland 3 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 8 8 8
Romania 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Slovakia 3 3 3 3 3 3 6 6 7 7 7 7 7
Slovenia n.a n.a 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Estonia n.a. n.a. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Latvia n.a n.a 8 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Lithuania n.a n.a 8 8 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Exchange rate regime description:
1: Dollarization, no separate legal tender
2: Currency Board, currency fully backed by foreign exchange reserves
3: Conventional Fixed Pegs, peg to another currency or currency basket within a band of at most –1%
4: Horizontal Bands, pegs with bands larger than  –1%
5: Crawling Pegs, pegs with central  parity periodically adjusted in fixed amounts at a fixed, pre-announced rate
or in response to changes in selected quantitative indicators
6: Crawling Bands, crawling pegs combined with bands of more than –1%
7: Managed Float with No Preannounced Exchange Rate Path, active intervention without precommitment to a
preannounced target or path for the exchange rate
  8: Independent Float, market-determined exchange rate and monetary policy independent of exchange rate
policy.
Sources:
1990 – 2000: Halpern, L. and Wyplosz, C.  2001. “Economic Transformation and Real Exchange Rates in the
2000s: The Balassa-Samuelson Connection.”   Table 2. Exchange Rate Arrangements.
2001 – 2002: Authors’ updates.32
Figure 1
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Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Data, 2002; authors’ computations
Figure 2
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Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Data, 2002; authors’ computations33
Figure 3
GDP per capita in per cent of German GDP per capita 
















Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Data, 2002; authors’ computations
Table 3.  Variability of GDP in the CEECs and the EU
Variability across the countries
1












Note: 1  Variances of log(GDP per capita), Euro, official rates
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Data, 2002;  authors’ computations34
Table 4. Size and degree of openness of the CEECs
Share of trade in GDP (%)         GDP per capita (US dollars)        Population (millions)
1992 2002 1992 2002 1992 2002
Bulgaria 100 106 781 2,094 8.5 7.9
Czech Rep. 108 127 2,293 7,571 10.3 10.3
Hungary 63 117 2,776 6,691 10.3 10.1
Poland 62 71 1,695 4,890 9.9 10.1
Romania 64 78 662 2,084 22.8 22.4
Slovakia 140 156 1,706 4,492 5.3 5.4
Slovenia 119 123 4,838 10,346 2.0 2.0
Estonia 114 180 523 4,869 1.5 1.4
Latvia 153 103 398 3,571 2.6 2.4
Lithuania 43 116 400 4,178 3.7 3.5
CEECs
average
97 118 1607 5079 8 8
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Data, 2002; authors’ computations
Table 5.  Current accounts    ( % of GDP )
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Bulgaria -4.2 -10.1 -0.3 -1.5 1.7 10.1 -0.5 -5.0 -5.6 -6.2 -4.6
Czech Rep. n.a. 1.3 -1.9 -2.6 -7.1 -6.7 -2.2 -2.7 -5.3 -4.6 -3.4
Hungary 0.9 -11.0 -9.8 -5.7 -3.7 -2.2 -4.9 -4.4 -2.9 -2.1 -4.3
Poland -0.2 0.3 -2.5 -0.1 -4.8 -6.1 -6.9 -8.5 -10.3 -9.0 -7.9
Romania -7.7 -4.7 -1.5 -5.0 -7.3 -6.1 -6.9 -3.6 -3.7 -5.9 -5.2
Slovakia n.a. -4.4 4.4 2.0 -10.2 -9.3 -9.0 -4.8 -3.4 -8.6 -8.4
Slovenia 7.4 1.5 4.0 -0.5 0.2 0.1 -0.7 -3.9 -3.4 -0.4 -1.2
Estonia 3.5 1.3 -7.2 -4.4 -9.1 -12.2 -9.1 -5.7 -5.6 -6.1 -10.2
Latvia 14.2 19.2 5.5 -0.4 -5.5 -6.1 -10.7 -9.9 -6.9 -9.7 -9.2
Lithuania n.a. -3.2 -2.2 -10.2 -9.2 -10.2 -12.1 -11.2 -6.0 -4.8 -6.1
CEECs
average
2.0 -1.0 -1.1 -2.8 -5.5 -4.9 -6.3 -6.0 -5.3 -5.7 -6.1
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Data, 2002; authors’ computations





1957 6 Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands sign the Treaty
establishing the European Economic Community.
1973 9 Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom join the EEC.
1981 10 Greece joins the EEC.
1986 12 Spain and  Portugal join the EEC.
1995 15 Austria, Finland and Sweden join the EU.
1998 15+6 EU accession negotiations are started with Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, the Czech
Republic, Slovenia and Estonia
2000 15+12 EU accession negotiations are started with Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Latvia,
Lithuania, and Malta.
2002 15+12 Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
Slovakia, and Slovenia are invited to join the EU on 1 May 2004; The accession
of Bulgaria and Romania is tentatively set for 1 January 2007.
 Sources:   http://www.mic.org.mt/Malta-EU/chronology.htm ;   http://www.euroobserver.com35
Annex A
Table A. Convergence of Ireland, Portugal, and Spain to the European Union as opposed
to the United States
(a)  Supply shocks, yearly
Period Coefficient a Coefficient b
Ireland Portugal Spain Ireland Portugal Spain
1970-2002 Mean 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.47 0.46 0.51
St Dev (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.19) (0.06)
1994-2002 Mean -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.42 0.34 0.45
St Dev (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
(b) Supply shocks, quarterly
Period Coefficient a Coefficient b
Ireland Portugal Spain Ireland Portugal Spain
1970-2002 Mean 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.45 0.51
St Dev (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02)
1994-2002 Mean -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.42 0.45 0.50




Mean 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.42 0.37 0.50
St Dev (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Note : 
1) 1970-1972 for Ireland; 1977-1985 for Portugal and Spain
(c)  Demand shocks, yearly
Period Coefficient a Coefficient b
Ireland Portugal Spain Ireland Portugal Spain
1970-2002 Mean -0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.39 0.37 0.44
St Dev (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
1994-2002 Mean -0.05 0.00 0.02 0.45 0.35 0.42
St Dev (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
(d) Demand  shocks, quarterly
Period Coefficient a Coefficient b
Ireland Portugal Spain Ireland Portugal Spain
1970-2002 Mean 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.43 0.37 0.50
St Dev (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
1994-2002 Mean 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.45 0.35 0.49




Mean 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.38 0.50
St Dev (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
Note : 
1) 1970-1972 for Ireland; 1977-1985 for Portugal and Spain36
Figure A.  Convergence of Ireland, Portugal, and Spain to the European Union as opposed
to the United States, 1970-2002
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Figure A (continued).  Convergence of Ireland, Portugal, and Spain to the European Union
as opposed to the United States, 1970-2002
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Annex  B
Table B.  Convergence of the CEECs towards the European Union as opposed to the
United States, 1994-2002
(a) Supply shocks
Czech Rep Estonia Hungary Latvia Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia
Coef a
Mean -0.07 0.16 0.10 0.07 0.04 -0.09 0.15 -0.08









St Dev (0.28) (0.20) (0.14) (0.14) (0.26) (0.13) (0.28) (0.37)
(b) Demand shocks
Czech Rep Estonia Hungary Latvia Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia
Coef a
Mean 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.15 0.24 0.07







4) 0.89 0.59 0.78
St Dev (0.11) (0.10) (0.04) (0.16) (0.19) (0.42) (0.09) (0.09)
Notes. The superscripts denote a comparison with the corresponding values of Ireland, Portugal and Spain prior
to their EU entry (estimated over 1970-1972 for Ireland, and 1977-1985 for Portugal and Spain) :
1) : inferior to Portuguese supply shocks coefficient b(t) (equal to 0.37)
2) : inferior to Irish supply shocks coefficient b(t) (equal to 0.42)
3) : inferior to Portuguese demand shocks coefficient b(t) (equal to 0.38)
4) : not exceeding  Spanish demand  shocks coefficient b(t) (equal to 0.50)39
Figure B. Convergence of the CEECs towards the European Union as opposed to the
United States, 1994-2002
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Figure B (continued). Convergence of the CEECs towards the European Union as opposed
to the United states, 1994-2002
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